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     1Sometimes interpreters apply a counterfactual test and ask how, given the lawmakers' beliefs and values, they
would have wanted their laws to apply to situations they did not consider; I'll comment on that variation later.  I
shall not consider lawmakers' intentions regarding the proper approach to interpreting their laws, as adding these
would further complicate matters without solving any of the problems for intentionalism that I'll discuss.
     2Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) at 509.
     3In a constitutional context, reference is usually made to "framers' intent."  I discuss the difference below.
     4At least in the US.  The idea is rarely, if ever, used to interpret judicial precedents, and I assume this limitation
hereafter.
Original Intent and Legal Interpretation
DAVID LYONS*
Introduction.
A judge or lawyer who wants to determine how a law should be applied will often refer to the
"intentions" of the lawmakers.  Judicial opinions, legal briefs, and scholars' writings seek
guidance from what the lawmakers intended their laws to achieve (intended purposes) or how the
lawmakers intended their laws to apply (contemplated applications).1  The idea is encapsulated in
passages like the following:
It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the
makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be within the
intention of the makers.2
A similar idea is employed in US constitutional adjudication.3  It is applied to written law
generally.4
Taken literally (and without the suggestion above that it is merely one canon of
construction among others), the idea is that the meaning or proper application of a law is
determined by certain historical facts about the mental states of those who made the law at the
time they did so.  I'll call this idea intentionalism.
My concern in this paper is intentionalism, its most serious problems, how it might be
refined, why refinement may not be possible, and how some seemingly intentionalist legal
practice might better be understood differently.
Intentionalism has never been systematically developed or plausibly defended.  Some
critics seem to accept it in principle only to reject it in practice, as when they say it cannot
reasonably be applied because we lack adequate information about lawmakers' intentions or that
the results of following original intent are morally or politically unacceptable.
I shall not discuss the consequences of intentionalist interpretation.  My argument
involves criteria of adequacy that apply to theories generally (not just to theories of
     5Intentionalism conflicts with the judicial obligation to respect interpretive (as well as other) precedents.  That
problem might be solved by a judicious compromise, and I shall not pursue it here.
interpretation, and not just in law).
As a theory, intentionalism faces some very serious problems.5  Briefly:  (a)
intentionalism needs but lacks a plausible justifying rationale; (b) it is ambiguous in significant
ways; (c) when lawmakers' intentions conflict, intentionalism derives contradictions from
coherent laws; (d) when lawmaking occurs without an intentional consensus, the theory implies
that coherent laws lack any proper application.  If such defects cannot be repaired, intentionalism
is untenable.
As I've noted, legal practice contains intentionalist arguments of two kinds:  one concerns
intended purposes, the other, contemplated applications.  I assume that unrestricted
intentionalism endorses both types of argument.  But as this duality creates one of the chief
problems for intentionalism, I shall later consider whether a revised theory can give priority to
one of these intentions.
I shall suggest that intentionalism is not adequately remediable.  There's little prospect of
refining the idea so that it might provide interpretive guidance.  In any case, seemingly
intentionalist interpretations are so weakly supported they invite reinterpretation.  I shall suggest
that many purposive interpretations are better understood as proposing justifying rationales for
laws -- an approach for which there is a plausible justifying rationale.  That mode of 
interpretation is, however, limited by the availability of genuine justifications.  As these are not
always available, I suggest there's little prospect of a defensible single-criterion theory of legal
interpretation.
The Rationale Problem.
Champions of intentionalism often write as if there were no plausible alternative -- as if no
competent, honest lawyer could sincerely question its approach to written law.  This may help to
explain why the theory has not been examined closely, save by some critics:  it has not been seen,
by its proponents, as a theory of interpretation.  A commentator must therefore attempt to
identify rationales for the approach by inferring them from the concerns expressed in discussions
that favor guidance by original intent, and must try to elaborate them sympathetically.
a. Some proponents of intentionalism suggest a reason for regarding it as obviously the
right approach to reading written law:  they believe that the meaning of a document is constituted
or determined by the intentions of those who created it.  This is suggested by the fact that we
sometimes seek clarification of a document or utterance by asking what the author had in mind. 
One writer develops the argument as follows:
Suppose my wife gives me a grocery list [that] reads in part, "Vegetarian chili -- pinto
beans, chili powder, Spanish onions, and various appropriate vegetables".... does this text
authorize or perhaps require the purchase of tomatoes?
....if I am interpreting what this grocery list has to say about tomatoes, then I am
attempting to determine if my wife meant tomatoes when she wrote "various appropriate
vegetables," and nothing more....  Thus if I am asking a question about a text's meaning, I
am asking what the author of the text meant to say, for the simple reason that that is the
3     6Paul F. Campos, "A Text is Just a Text", (1996) 19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 327.
     7I assume this qualification hereafter.  We are concerned here not with the bare meaning of a string of words but
with the meaning of a particular use of words.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldsworthy, "Implications in Language, Law and
the Constitution", in Lindell (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law.
only meaning the text has or could have.6
This writer confuses the meaning of a specific text (the meaning of a string of words as they are
used on a particular occasion7) with what the person meant who used those words (what that
person had in mind).
The writer is not sure what vegetables his wife regards as appropriate for vegetarian chili
but he suspects that they include tomatoes.  We can agree that his practical question is whether to
buy tomatoes and that the answer depends on whether his wife had tomatoes in mind.
The interesting point is that, even when we make these assumptions, we find that, rather
than bolster his claim about meaning, his example refutes it.
We can see this by asking how he knows that the grocery list concerns ingredients for
vegetarian chili.  His story tells us that he learns this from reading the grocery list that his wife
gave him.   Knowing it is a grocery list (and not a postmodern poem), when he reads "Vegetarian
chili -- pinto beans, chili powder, Spanish onions, and various appropriate vegetables," he
understands that he is to purchase pinto beans, chili powder, Spanish onions, and other
vegetables that are appropriate for vegetarian chili.  That is, at most, what the grocery list says. 
His question -- whether to purchase tomatoes, which for him is the question whether his wife had
tomatoes in mind when she asked him to purchase vegetables appropriate for vegetarian chili --
does not arise unless and until he reads and understands the list.  An answer to his question
would not tell him more about the meaning of the string of words as his wife used them.  He
already knows its meaning.  He understands the grocery list independently of knowing what
vegetables his wife had in mind.
 For similar reasons, he might wonder whether the language that she used accurately
expresses what she has in mind.  This familiar question assumes that the meaning of the language
used by an author is not determined by what the author had in mind.  It is determined, basically,
by linguistic conventions of the time.
Suppose that, while composing the grocery list, the writer's wife had been listening to a
radio program about a Spanish court's attempt to extradite former General Pinochet from
England and that, thus preoccupied, she had written "Vegetarian Chile."  Even if he had not
heard the radio broadcast and were ignorant of the circumstances, he might make an educated
guess that his wife meant vegetarian chili but used the wrong word.  Knowing that she had given
him a grocery list, he could figure out what she probably meant to write.  That assumes he can
distinguish what she had in mind from the meaning of the words she used.
It is sometimes said that courts should look first at the texts of written law because they
provide the best evidence of the lawmakers' intentions.  But it is possible to infer their intentions
from the texts they used only if we can understand the texts independently of their further
intentions.  Looking for evidence of lawmakers' intentions in the legal texts rejects the notion that
their intentions determine the meaning of the texts.
We must therefore be wary of any rationales for an intentionalist approach to written law
4which assume that the meaning of a particular legal text is determined by the lawmakers'
intentions.  To be justified in interpreting legal texts in terms of original intent, one must have
good and sufficient reason to ignore the normal meaning of texts based on linguistic convention.
b. As I've suggested, support for the idea of appealing to lawmakers' intentions may be
found in the practice of seeking to understand documents and utterances by reference to their
authors' intentions.  This is done not only in conversation and other personal communications but
also, for example, in scholarly studies and the interpretation of wills and contracts.  The point
here is that we may be more interested in what the person meant than in the meaning of the
particular inscription or utterance.
Two considerations should make us hesitate to ground an intentionalist approach on such
practices.  In the first place, endorsements of an intentionalist approach often emphasize that it
allows interpretation to be based solely on historical fact; but the examples given do not satisfy
that description.
Scholarly studies are often regulated by a "principle of charity."  They aim at a generous
reading, seeking to identify the most defensible positions that are compatible with the relevant
texts, not those that reflect the author's mental state.  We learn most from critical commentary
that is so conducted, whether the results favor or disfavor the positions that are appraised.  When
it is so regulated, favorable criticism refines the position that is tentatively defended, and
unfavorable criticism avoids the mistake of disparaging a straw man.
Somewhat analogous principles govern the interpretation of legal texts, which are
officially interpreted within the constraints of law.  Contracts are frequently qualified by courts
so as to accord with principles of public policy, and legislation is construed, when possible, so as
to satisfy constitutional requirements, regardless of the intentions of the contractors and
lawmakers.
In the second place, written law, such as statutes and constitutions, have a different social
role from private communications between individuals.  Laws lay down behavioral guidelines for
people, most of whom will never know much about the lawmakers' mental states.  Many of those
whose conduct will be regulated by written law do not even exist when it is enacted or ratified. 
Nor do lawmakers assume that those who will be bound by their laws will have any notion of
their (the lawmakers') intentions, save, perhaps, that they intended to create the laws in question. 
In these respects, at least, written law is substantially and significantly impersonal.
It can be difficult for those who are subject to such laws to become familiar with their
detailed provisions.  Most of us would find it not merely difficult but impossible to become
knowledgeable about the lawmakers' transient mental states.  It would be unreasonable and unfair
to hold us accountable under restrictions that the lawmakers had in mind instead of those that
they embedded in the language of the law.
c. Champions of intentionalism sometimes suggest that adjudication should implement
the "value choices" that were made by those who enacted or ratified the law when they decided to
make those legal changes.  Authoritative judicial interpretation should be guided only by those
past value judgments and should not be affected by value judgments of those who apply the law. 
Interpretation should in this sense be "value-free."  Interpretation guided by fresh value
5     8Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems", (1971) 47 Indiana Law Journal 1.  The
call for value-free adjudication may reflect philosophical skepticism about values, as in the Bork article.  It may be
combined with an appeal to democratic principles, discussed next.
judgments is claimed to distort the written law, because in making fresh value judgments judges
are thought to impose their personal values on the law.8
There are two problems here.  In the first place, the concern to prevent judges from
making fresh value judgments when interpreting and applying laws offers no ground for thinking
that implementing the lawmakers' value judgments constitutes fidelity to the laws they have
officially laid down.  We have already acknowledged the commonplace distinction between the
public meaning of a document that an author creates and what she had in mind when creating it. 
Lawmakers' "value choices" are presumably their reasons for the lawmaking that they have done: 
what they hoped to achieve, and why.  The question we must ask is why we should suppose that
courts should implement such value judgments when doing so would differ from applying the
laws according to their public meaning.
In the second place, we have good reason to believe that fidelity to law sometimes
requires fresh value judgments by interpreters.
Suppose that the government exercises its power of eminent domain and condemns your
house in order to make way for a public highway that is under construction.  Let's assume that the
constitution of your state (like that of other states as well as of the US federal government) says
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."  Given the
facts, this provision tells us you are legally entitled to just compensation.
The constitution does not tell us how to determine when compensation is just, but it
assumes there is something to be determined.  Its identification would seem to require value
judgments.  An interpreter must decide, for example, whether just compensation is affected by
any injustice that was involved in your acquisition of the house; whether the criterion of
whatever compensation you deserve depends on its economic value, rather than its value of
another kind; in that case, whether compensation should be determined by its market value or its
replacement cost; and so on.
If a judge were interpreting the just compensation clause without assistance from
interpretive precedents or if she wished to question such precedents, a reasonable judgment
would require her to identify and defend criteria of compensatory justice for such "takings." 
Defense of the criteria would ideally involve a systematic inquiry into the theory of
compensatory justice.  It is difficult to see how any such criteria could be defended without the
interpreter making moral judgments.
Examples like these, concerning the interpretation of explicit moral language in the law,
suggest that sound interpretation and fidelity to written law sometimes requires that judges make
fresh value judgments.
The original argument therefore provides no reason to suppose that the interpretation of
written law must always be based solely on historical facts, such as facts about the lawmakers'
intentions, and should never incorporate fresh value judgments by the interpreters.
d. It is sometimes suggested that democratic values require adherence to the doctrine of
6     9See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, "The Notion of a Living Constitution", (1976) 54 Texas Law Review 693. 
This argument sometimes emphasizes that legislators are elected but judges are not.  It has limited force, because the
appointment of a federal judge is subject to approval by the US Senate, whose members are elected; it has limited
application, as many state and local judges are either elected or can serve beyond an initial term only by election.
original intent.9  Democracy involves popular participation in the governing process, such as
voting for representatives who are authorized to make law.  It is arguable that democratic values
are violated when majorities are tyrannical and oppress groups or individuals.  This suggests that
democratic values require more than majority rule, that governments must respect and enforce
basic rights of individuals and minorities.
On any interpretation, democratic principles are understood to call on us to respect the
laws of a democratic society.  They provide a special reason for judges to enforce a
democratically established constitution and the laws that are created or maintained by a
democratically elected legislature.
It is unclear, however, how democratic principles, on any interpretation, provide a reason
for understanding written law on the basis of the lawmakers's intentions rather than, say, the laws'
publicly ascertainable meaning.
Let's imagine the ideal lawmaking situation.  Let's assume that the lawmakers have
responsibly exercised their authority to make law, just as the electorate has exercised its authority
to place or keep them in office and to express their political judgment about proposed
constitutional arrangements or legislation.  The lawmakers have deliberated reasonably and have
formed well-grounded ideas of what their lawmaking decisions would accomplish and why that
would be a good thing overall.  The question remains, how we should understand their laws.
No matter how much we expand our description of an ideal democratic process, it does
not seem to tell us that the proper way to understand or apply written law is to follow the
lawmakers' intentions rather than the meaning of the texts that they have enacted into laws.  The
challenge for proponents of intentionalism is to provide a reasonable, persuasive case for the
approach that they endorse.
The suggested justifications of intentionalism appear to fail.  Our consideration of them in
fact shows that intentionalism needs support.  This does not mean that it has been refuted.  It
does mean, however, that there is a reasonable presumption against intentionalist practice.  We
turn now to a more direct appraisal of the doctrine.
A Contradiction Problem.
My first example will show how intentionalism can generate contradictions.
Elizabeth and William Stern wanted children, but doctors believed that pregnancy would
be dangerous to Mrs. Stern.  As the couple wished to continue Mr. Stern's family line, they did
not want to adopt a child.  Instead, they sought a "surrogate" mother -- someone who would
receive William's sperm by artificial insemination, carry the baby to term and, if all went well,
give the baby to the Sterns.  Mr. Stern would be recognized as the father, and Mrs. Stern would
adopt the child.
7     10The text of the contract is appended to the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court, In re Baby M, 109 N.J.
396 (1988) at 470-475, which modified the family court judgment.
     11In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. 313 (1987) at 374 (hereafter Baby M).
Mary Beth Whitehead wished to take on the surrogate's role.  She and her husband,
Richard, who agreed, already had children of their own.  The two couples were brought together
by a private company that made such arrangements.
Mrs. Whitehead followed the prescribed procedures and became pregnant.  By the time of
delivery, however, she found herself unable to part with her new baby daughter.  The Sterns
wanted the infant, and Mr. Stern sought legal enforcement of the surrogacy contract.
Mr. Stern's request faced some legal obstacles, which the court was obliged to address. 
I'll discuss only the one that Judge Sorkow of the New Jersey family court specifically noted.
Under the surrogacy contract,10 Mrs. Whitehead was to renounce her parental rights so
that the infant would have no legally recognized mother and Mrs. Stern might adopt her.  As
Judge Sorkow noted,11 however, New Jersey statute 9:3-54 prohibits private individuals from
arranging for money to change hands "in connection with" an adoption.  That language might
appear vague, but it suits the adoption context.
Private individuals are not empowered by law to transfer parental rights.  Mrs. Whitehead
might hand the newborn child to the Sterns, but she could not make Mrs. Stern its legally
recognized mother.  Only a court could do that.  But if Mrs. Whitehead formally renounced her
legal rights as parent of the child, Mrs. Stern could petition the court to adopt her.
Under the surrogacy contract Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid $1,000 if she followed all
the prescribed procedures but the child were stillborn. (§ 10)  She was to be paid $10,000 if the
baby were born live, she gave it to the Sterns, and took the legal steps necessary to renounce her
parental rights (§§ 1, 4(A)) so that Mrs. Stern could adopt the baby.  Unless Mrs. Whitehead did
all that, she would not qualify for the $10,000. (§ 4(B))  The surrogacy contract thus provided for
money to change hands "in connection with" an adoption.  It was the tightest possible connection
that private parties could create between a money payment and an adoption.
Judge Sorkow acknowledged the problem.  (Baby M at 374, 372.)  If statute 9:3-54
applied to the Stern-Whitehead surrogacy contract, then the contract violated the law.
Judge Sorkow offered three arguments against the application of 9:3-54.  He observed,
for example, that Mrs. Stern "is not a party to the contract" in order to "avoid any possible
inference that there is a violation of N.J.S.A. 9:3-54." (Id at 374)  Judge Sorkow seems to suggest
that the statute would be violated only if Elizabeth Stern signed the contract.  But that would be a
very narrow reading of the statute, which says,
No person ... shall make, offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for
adoption and in connection therewith (1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any
valuable consideration ... or (2) Take, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any
valuable consideration....  Any person ... violating this section shall be guilty of a high
misdemeanor. (N.J.S. 9:3-54)
In other words, participating in an agreement to exchange money in connection with an adoption
is illegal, and the Stern-Whitehead surrogacy contract was such an arrangement.
8     12I assume this intentionalist qualification hereafter.
The contract included a clause which said that the money payment to Mrs. Whitehead "is
compensation for services and expenses, and in no way is to be construed as a fee for termination
of parental rights or a payment in exchange for a consent to surrender the child for adoption." (§
4)  Judge Sorkow accepted this view of the contract (Baby M at 372), but it is implausible.  First,
the contract made separate provision for reimbursement of expenses incurred by the Whiteheads.
(§§ 4(C), 6)  Second, if the money payment were for conceiving and bearing a child, Mrs.
Whitehead would receive $10,000 if the baby were stillborn, not the stipulated $1,000.  Third,
the contract required Mrs. Whitehead to give up the baby and renounce her parental rights. 
Despite its disclaimer, the contract plainly implied that $9,000 was payment for Mrs.
Whitehead's surrendering the child for adoption.
As he issued a judgment for Mr. Stern, therefore, it was necessary for Judge Sorkow to
provide a better argument that New Jersey adoption statutes, such as 9:3-54, did not apply.  Here
is a third argument given by Judge Sorkow:
It is in this court's view that the laws of adoption in this State do not apply to surrogacy
contracts....  [A review of the legislative history reveals that] at the time that even the
most current adoption laws were adopted, no thought or consideration was given to the
law's effect or relevance to surrogacy.  Surrogacy [contracts were] ... unknown when the
laws of adoption were passed. (Baby M at 372)
If surrogacy contracts were unknown when the New Jersey legislature last revised its adoption
laws, none of the lawmakers could then have thought specifically that those laws should be
applied to adoptions made in connection with surrogacy contracts.  On that basis, Judge Sorkow
reasoned that New Jersey adoption laws did not apply in a surrogacy context.
Judge Sorkow assumed, in effect, that a statute applies to a situation only if the legislature
actually considered (and, presumably, approved of) the application, even if that limitation is not
implied by the statute and thus clashes with the letter of the law.  His application of this principle
appears to have the following structure:
 LAn A statute applies only if the enacting legislators (at the time of enactment)
12 thought about
the situation and intended it to apply;
  F1 As surrogacy contracts were unknown when the legislature most recently revised its
adoption laws, the legislators could not have thought about surrogacy contracts, could not
have consciously intended their statutes to apply in contexts involving surrogacy
contracts, and consequently had no such intentions; therefore,
  C1 Statute 9:3-54, which regulates adoptions, does not apply to situations involving
surrogacy contracts, including this case.
Judge Sorkow's principle is dubious.  The members of the New Jersey legislature
probably never thought about many situations to which their adoption statutes would seem to
apply.  If they never thought about adoptions on Wednesdays, for example, principle LAn implies
that their statutes do not apply to Wednesday adoptions.  I venture to say that no one believes
this.  But if their failure to consider Wednesday adoptions does not render their statutes
inapplicable to Wednesday adoptions, why should we believe that their failure to consider
surrogacy contracts means that their statutes do not apply when surrogacy is a prelude to
9     13I'll omit this qualification hereafter.
adoption?
An intentionalist solution to this problem might seem to be available.  Judge Sorkow
contrasted surrogacy with cases in which a
woman is already pregnant....  The biological father may be unknown or at best
uninterested in his obligations.  The woman may want to keep the child but cannot do so
for financial reasons. (Baby M at 371-372)
The woman may be financially pressured into giving up her baby.  She may later come to regret
doing so and may suffer debilitating depression as a consequence.  The unregulated transaction
might result in a placement that harms the child.  Judge Sorkow claimed that,
In surrogacy, none of these "downside" elements appear.  The arrangement is made when
the desire and intention to have a family exist on the couples [sic] part.  The surrogate has
an opportunity to consult, take advice and consider her act and is not forced into the
relationship.  She is not yet pregnant. (Id)
Suppose the legislature wanted statute 9:3-54 to alleviate problems resulting from
unregulated adoptions like those referred to by Judge Sorkow.  We can then construct an
argument based on those legislative intentions, as follows:
 LPn A statute applies to a situation only if its application serves the purpose (such as
alleviating certain problems)13 that the enacting legislators intended for the statute.
  P1 New Jersey statute 9:3-54 was intended by the enacting legislators to protect mothers
from undue financial pressures that might lead them to give up infants for adoption when
that would not serve the children's best interests, decisions the mothers would later regret.
  F2 In surrogacy contexts mothers are not subjected to undue financial pressures that might
lead them to give up infants for adoption that would not serve the children's best interests,
decisions the mothers would later regret.
  C2 New Jersey statute 9:3-54 does not apply to situations involving surrogacy contracts, such
as this case.
This reasoning would seem to explain further why the statute does not apply in a surrogacy
context.  If applying the statute on Wednesdays has no causal relevance to serving its intended
purpose, then this argument enables us to distinguish Wednesday applications of the statute from
applications to a surrogacy context, which do have such relevance.
Unfortunately, the new argument founders on its assumption that surrogacy does not
entail the problems referred to by Judge Sorkow.  The Baby M case arose from such difficulties. 
Mrs. Whitehead's behavior shows that those problems can and sometimes do arise in a surrogacy
context.  Furthermore, Mrs. Whitehead's predicament may well have had its origins in the
prospect of earning $10,000, given the financial pressures on her family.  If that's right, then
premise F2 is false, argument LPn-C2 is unsound, and conclusion C2 may be false.
The possibility we are now considering has distressing consequences for intentionalism. 
To see this, we must first expand LPn, so that it reads:
 LP A statute applies to a situation if and only if its application serves the purpose that the
10
     14Another plausible expansion of principle LPn is:
 LP' A statute applies to a situation if and only if its application serves the purpose that the enacting legislators
intended for the statute; a statute does not apply if and only if its application disserves (defeats or tends to
defeat) the purpose that the enacting legislators intended for the statute.
Unlike principle LP, principle LP' holds that a statute neither applies nor fails to apply if its application would
neither serve nor disserve its intended purpose or if the enacting legislators failed to endorse a purpose for it; it
implies that statutes can be applicationally indeterminate even when the enacting legislators endorsed a purpose for
the statute.  I'll turn to this sort of ambiguity later.
     15Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) at 509.
     16This particular use of principle LP does not actually expand the statute beyond its language but simply allows
for the generation of conclusion C3.
enacting legislators intended for the statute.14
The expansion of conditional principle LPn to biconditional principle LP is substantial.  Whereas
principle LPn would reduce the scope of a law from what the law's language would seem to
determine, principle LP would also expand the scope of a statute beyond the apparent limits of its
language.
The rationale for an expansion is intentionalism, which seems to require the fuller
principle because its proponents say, unqualifiedly, that the proper application of a law is
determined by the lawmakers' intentions.  Recall the quotation that began, "It is a familiar canon
of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much
within the statute as if it were within the letter."15
Here's a revised legislative purpose argument for the Baby M case:
  LP A statute applies to a situation if and only if its application serves the purpose that the
enacting legislators intended for the statute.
  P1 New Jersey statute 9:3-54 was intended by the enacting legislators to protect mothers
from undue financial pressures that might lead them to give up infants for adoption when
that would not serve the children's best interests, decisions the mothers would later regret.
  F3 In surrogacy contexts mothers can be subjected to undue financial pressures that can lead
them to give up infants for adoption when that would not serve the children's best
interests, decisions the mothers would later regret, as in this case.
  C3 New Jersey statute 9:3-54 can apply to situations involving surrogacy contracts, and does
apply to this case.16
This argument does not solve the problem we found in Judge Sorkow's original, contemplated
applications argument.
And another problem for intentionalism emerges.  Consider the conclusions of the two
surviving arguments.  Judge Sorkow's contemplated applications argument gave us:
  C1 New Jersey statute 9:3-54, which regulates adoptions, does not apply to situations
involving surrogacy contracts, such as this case.
The intended purpose argument, suggested by Judge Sorkow's further comments, gives us
  C3 New Jersey statute 9:3-54, which regulates adoptions, can apply to situations involving
surrogacy contracts, and does apply to this case.
These propositions are inconsistent.  If intentionalism provides a foundation for both, then it
11
     17See, respectively, David Brink, "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review", (1988) 17
Philosophy & Public Affairs 105, Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1992) at 171.
     18For an intentionalist theory seeking guidance from dispositional attitudes, see Richard Posner, "Statutory
Interpretation -- in the Classroom and in the Courtroom," 50 University of Chicago Law Review 800 (1983).
     19Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
generates incoherent guidance for those who are called on to apply the law.  If the contradiction
is generated from a statute that is in fact coherent, as New Jersey statute 9:3-54 appears to be,
then intentionalism is responsible for the inconsistency and is untenable.
This problem is not an artifact of unreasonable assumptions.  It results from applying
original intent doctrine straightforwardly to ordinary legislation.  In practice, distinct species of
legislative intention can conflict, as they appear to do in this case.
Lawmaking is a fallible process.  The most responsible legislators might misjudge the
effects of a proposed law.  It is inevitable that applying a law as the lawmakers intended will
sometimes fail to serve or will even frustrate the lawmakers' purpose.  In any such case, the
application of intentionalist principles generates similar contradictions.
We can imagine ways of enabling intentionalism to avoid contradictions.  One is to
stipulate a hierarchy among lawmaking intentions.  But an arbitrary stipulation would discredit
rather than save the theory.  And intentionalism suggests no reason for the hierarchy.
Some think that logic or psychology makes contemplated applications subordinate to
intended purposes.17  If apprised of a conflict, a lawmaker would supposedly adjust her attitude
towards applications so that enforcement of the law would serve her purposes.  If this were true,
it would not help in a case like Baby M, however, because the lawmakers could not recognize the
conflict prior to enactment.
One might refer instead to their attitudinal dispositions and claim counterfactually that, if
they had seen the conflict, they would have adjusted their applicational intentions accordingly.18 
However, what they would do depends on the variable conditions we attach to the counterfactual
supposition.  Furthermore, the psychological assumption is dubious.  Lawmakers might adjust
their aims instead of their attitudes towards applications.
To see this, consider another example.  A critic of the Supreme Court's equal protection
ruling against school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education observed that the post-Civil
War Congress that proposed the 14th amendment had itself imposed racial segregation on public
schools in Washington, DC.19  If the members of that Congress who supported the 14th
amendment were strongly committed to racial segregation, it is quite possible that they would
have qualified their aspirations for its equal protection clause so as to permit racial segregation in
the public schools.  In other words, the lawmakers would have tailored their intended purposes so
as to exclude applications that would be unacceptable to them.  Intended purposes are not always
attitudinally dominant, and we cannot reasonably revise intentionalism by supposing that they
are.
Another way to prevent intentionalist principles from generating contradictions is to
weaken the principles.  We might begin by expanding the relevant principles.  For example, we
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could expand principle LAn in the way we expanded principle LPn.  We would get:
  LA A statute applies if and only if the enacting legislators thought about the situation and
intended the statute to apply,
which holds that a statute does not apply if the legislators did not think about the possible
application or they thought about it and disapproved.
A new problem arises here:  an alternative, nonequivalent expansion of principle LAn is
available, as follows:
 LA' A statute applies if and only if the enacting legislators thought about the situation and
intended it to apply; a statute does not apply if and only if the enacting legislators
thought about the situation and intended it not to apply,
which implies that a statute neither applies nor does not apply to a situation if the legislators did
not form either a positive or negative intention concerning the situation, because they thought
about it but did not make up their minds or because they did not think about it.  Principle LA'
implies that statutes can be applicationally indeterminate.
Principle LA provides more interpretational guidance than principle LA', but it can also
help to generate more conflicts and threatens more frequently to generate contradictions. 
Intentionalism offers no basis for resolving this ambiguity.  For present purposes, I'll ignore the
complication.
The next step is to revise principles LP and LA so as to eliminate contradictions resulting
from their application to conflicting intentions.  Once again, however, an ambiguity arises:  there
are alternative ways of weakening intentionalist principles, with competing advantages from the
standpoint of intentionalist theory.
One possibility is to weaken principles LP and LA so that they determine an outcome
when, but only when, they do not conflict with the implications of other original intent
principles, as follows:
 LPx In the absence of conflicting legislative intentions, a statute applies to a situation if and
only if its application serves the purpose that the enacting legislators intended for the
statute.
 LAx In the absence of conflicting legislative intentions, a statute applies if and only if the
enacting legislators thought about the situation and intended the statute to apply.
Suppose that the surrogacy situation was as we last imagined it, so that the statute's intended
purpose would be served by its application, although the legislators never considered the
application.  The application of unqualified principles LP and LA would generate a contradiction;
but the application of qualified principles LPx and LAx would not.
But that solution merely substitutes one problem for another.  Under the assumed
circumstances, the weakening qualifier prevents either principle from generating interpretational
guidance, because the principles offer guidance only in the absence of conflicting intentions.  The
problem before was that intentionalist reasoning told us too much; now it tells us too little.
Here's an alternative way to weaken principles LP and LA so that their application avoids
contradictions but provides some determinate guidance:
 LPw In the absence of overriding legislative intentions, a statute applies to a situation if and
only if its application serves the purpose that the enacting legislators intended for the
statute.
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 LAw In the absence of overriding legislative intentions, a statute applies if and only if the
enacting legislators thought about the situation and intended the statute to apply.
Modifications like these would prevent intentionalist principles from generating contradictions,
without weakening them so much that their application when intentions conflict would not
provide interpretational guidance.
The qualifications incorporated into principles LPw and LAw allow for the possibility that
some legislative intentions sometimes outweigh others.  But intentionalist theory implies no such
hierarchy of lawmaking intentions, so the two new principles do not tell us how the relevant
interpretational guidance may be extracted.  Unless that problem can be solved, principles LPw
and LAw provide as little guidance as principles LPx and LAx.
Intentionalist theory does not appear to endorse one particular set of principles.  If we try
to refine intentionalism so that it does not generate contradictions, we come upon one ambiguity
after another, with no apparent resolution.  The result is a theory that will frequently be too
indeterminate to apply.
An Indeterminacy Problem.
Everything said so far can apply when law is made by one person acting alone.  But most law is
made by groups of persons in legislative assemblies, constitutional conventions, and the like.  For
illustrative purposes, I'll focus on the legislative case.
When a statute is enacted by a legislature, intentionalism would seem to regard as
relevant intentions that can be attributed to the legislature as a whole.  The first question in this
context, then, is how to assign intentions to a legislature.  Some theorists have thought it
nonsensical to imagine that legislatures have intentions.  Intentions are mental states, which
legislatures do not have.  Legislatures do deliberate and act, however, so we should entertain the
possibility that they can have intentions.
That intentions can be shared by a number of individuals makes possible symphony
orchestras, football teams, and other forms of cooperation and coordination.  It seems reasonable
to ascribe an intention to a group when it is shared by the group's members -- or at least by a
goodly portion of them.
I shall call the condition that must be satisfied for the true ascription of an intention to a
lawmaking body20 an intentional consensus.
How shall we define an intentional consensus?  The need for a definition might have been
obscured by Judge Sorkow's legislative intent argument in the Baby M case.  He held that
surrogacy contracts had never been thought of when the legislature last reviewed its adoption
statutes.  If no one had ever thought of surrogacy contracts, no one could have thought
specifically of applying the adoption statutes in a surrogacy context.  It follows that the conscious
approval of such applications could not be attributed to the legislature.  For that negative point,
no intentional consensus is required.  The need for an intentional consensus arises when we
entertain the attribution of a positive intention to a legislature, such as the intention that a law
14
     21Thus the purposive intention argument that I constructed for that case did assume an intentional consensus.
     22Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding", (1980) 60 Boston University Law
Review 204 at 209-217.
     23Though the intentions of legislators may vary, common elements might ground an intentional consensus. 
Suppose that, when the city council enacted a law banning motor vehicles from the park, all councillors had in mind
the safety of park users while just one councillor also saw the ban as promoting a quieter, more restful refuge.  We
might then regard safety but not quiet as an intended purpose of the law.
     24Indeed, they acted without prior legal authorizatiion, as their charge was to propose revisions of the Articles of
Confederation, not a substantially new constitution.
serve a particular purpose21 or that it be applied in a given type of situation.
One commentator has suggested that we think of legislators as casting "intention-votes."22 
A legislator with a purposive or applicational attitude towards a proposed law casts a
corresponding intention-vote concerning the law.  Thus a five-member legislative body which
makes law by majority vote might be said to have a given intention when it is shared by three or
more of its members.23
But intentionalism would seem to count only the lawmaking intentions of those who vote
for an adopted law.  It would not count the intentions of those who did not vote favorably,
because their intentions are not constituents of a legislative act.
A simple majority does not always suffice to enact a law.  Sometimes legal change
requires a "super-majority."  A two-thirds majority in each house of Congress is required to enact
a law that the President has vetoed.  Ratification of an amendment to the US Constitution
requires affirmative votes by three-quarters of the states.
Legislative procedures can involve greater complications, as when they confer special
powers upon particular officials.  The Constitution empowers the President to veto bills that
Congress has approved.  As the President participates in the legislative process and his initial
veto may result in revision of a proposed law, his legislative intentions should be counted.  His
legislative role can be more consequential than that of any individual legislator, so his legislative
intentions might reasonably count more than those of ordinary legislators in determining an
intentional consensus.  It is unclear how the construction of an intentional consensus should take
account of the President's intentions when they differ from the intentions of some legislators. 
Though I shall ignore this complication hereafter, it introduces new sources of indeterminacy into
intentionalism.
This complication suggests another.  Intention-votes might be identified and perhaps even
weighted, not according to a person's official role in the lawmaking process, but based on her
causal contribution to the legal change.
Intentionalist arguments appear to vacillate between these two criteria.  When statutes are
interpreted, intentionalist reasoning seems to count only the intentions of those who are officially
involved in the lawmaking process, but this is not true of intentionalist interpretations in the
constitutional context, which concern "framers' intent."  The term refers, for example, to the
lawmaking attitudes of those who in 1787 proposed a new constitution for the United States,24 or
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who actively supported its ratification,25 as well as those in Congress who proposed or supported
subsequent constitutional amendments.26  By contrast, scant notice is given to the intentions of
those in the several states whose official votes effected ratification.
The contrast I have drawn is too stark.  Ordinary legislation is routinely interpreted by
reference to reports from legislative committees, although these and the bills themselves are
frequently drafted by hired staff who are not members of the legislature.  Bills are sometimes
drafted by influential private lobbyists.  In the context of statutory construction, therefore, it
would seem that intentionalist interpretations are often based, not on the attitudes of those with
an official role in the lawmaking process, but on the attitudes of those who causally contributed
to the legal change.
How should we resolve this ambiguity of intentionalism?  It is plausible to suppose that
many of those who vote for a bill in the legislature or who vote to ratify a constitution or a
constitutional amendment endorse positions that are taken by those who have designed or
advocated the legal change.  But we cannot reasonably assume that the number of them who
embrace such attitudes are sufficient to constitute an intentional consensus.  To assume that
would beg the very question I shall raise.
We should look to intentionalism's justifying rationales for a principled answer to these
questions.  Until plausible rationales are identified, however, the doctrine will retain this
additional degree of indeterminacy.
In order to explain a difficulty arising from the need for an intentional consensus, I will
ignore the complications I've just discussed.  I'll pretend that a change in written law requires
only a simple majority and I'll suppose that the intentions that count are the intentions of those
who officially vote for the change.
I'll assume, therefore, that an intentional consensus obtains when a given intention
concerning the meaning, purpose, or application of a bill is shared at the time of voting by a
sufficient number of those who voted favorably so that, given the number of those who voted
unfavorably, if only those who shared the particular intention had voted favorably, the bill would
have been enacted into law.  In short, similar intention-votes must outnumber the unfavorable
votes.  These are among the weakest conditions we might imagine for an intentional consensus,
and among the easiest to satisfy.
The problem is this.  The legal rules that tell us how to change the law do not require,
assume, presuppose, or imply that those who cast votes have any particular intentions about the
legal change, except perhaps to have their votes counted as favorable or unfavorable or as official
abstentions.  It is always an open factual question what other intentions they actually have.  We
have no reason to assume that a consensus obtains, and we have good reason to be skeptical.
We can focus on the favorable votes, as the intentions of those who cast them are the only
ones that might contribute to an intentional consensus.  Let's assume that all those who vote
favorably do so intentionally.
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Those who vote for a bill need not have the same purpose for it in mind or the same ideas
about its appropriate applications.  Not all of those who vote favorably even form relevant
intentions.  Lawmakers do not attend all sessions of the legislative assembly.  When present they
do not always pay attention to the debate.  They do not read all bills on which they vote.  In the
rushed conclusion to legislative sessions, when many bills are acted upon hurriedly, legislators
may vote without any clear idea of a bill's content, purpose, or applications.  Lawmakers
sometimes vote under party discipline or because they believe their votes will serve some
extraneous objective, such as securing their own reelection or favors from lobbyists.  When a
legislator votes for a bill for such reasons, we cannot assume that she also truly endorses the
legislative intentions of those legislators who have some substantive understanding of it.
Imagine that when the city council enacted a law banning vehicles from the park, it did so
by a three to two majority, that only two of those who voted favorably actually wanted to ban
vehicles from the park, and that the other favorable vote was cast by a city councillor who agreed
with the dissenters that cars should be permitted in the park but voted to ban them because he
thought a favorable vote greatly improved his chances for reelection.  In that case, there's no
intentional consensus -- either to ban vehicles from the park (because there's too few positive
intention-votes) or to allow them there (because the negative intention-votes are not linked with a
corresponding legal outcome).27
In other words, it is quite possible for there to be no intentional consensus regarding a
given change in written law, such as a legislative enactment or a constitutional amendment.  And
it seems inevitable that this sometimes happens.
Let's consider a real example:  Steelworkers v. Weber.28  The question it posed was
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited a program at the Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corporation plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, that had been created under a collective
bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America.  The program
trained unskilled employees for skilled jobs.  Applicants were admitted according their length of
service, save that half of the openings were reserved for African-American employees.  This was
to continue until African-American representation in skilled jobs at the Kaiser plant was
equivalent to the percentage of Blacks in the local labor force.
A white employee, Brian Weber, was denied admission to the Kaiser training program
when Black employees with less seniority were admitted.  He challenged the program under the
Civil Rights Act, which penalizes employers who "discriminate against any individual" or
"deprive any individual of employment opportunities ... because of such individual's race." (§
703(a))
As a result of severe, long-standing discrimination, African-Americans held few skilled
jobs at the Kaiser plant or in other local industry.  If that discrimination had ended, then the
number of African-Americans in skilled jobs would eventually rise -- very slowly.  A program
like Kaiser's could be expected to accelerate the change.  One question facing the Supreme Court
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was whether the Act outlawed programs that were aimed at the legacy of past discrimination.  By
a five to two majority, the Supreme Court said no.
Some members of Congress had been worried that the government might impose a
program like Kaiser's, and the bill was amended to bar the government from doing so. (§ 703(j)) 
The Act says nothing about voluntary programs such as Kaiser's.  There was little or no
discussion in Congress of voluntary programs, so there most likely was no applicational
consensus regarding them.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan seemed to offer an intended purpose argument. 
He said, for example, "The purposes of the [Kaiser program] mirror those of the statute.  Both
were designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." (443 US 193 at
208)  Such an interpretation was radically undersupported by the evidence that he offered, which
relied on remarks by only four of the bill's supporters.  The bill was controversial, and we have
no idea how many others who voted favorably shared its strongest supporters' intentions.29
There is reason to believe that some who supported the bill did so for extraneous reasons. 
The US was competing with the Soviet Union for influence within the former European colonies
in Africa and Asia.  The populations of those newly independent states, who had been subjected
to racist domination by European powers, tended to identify with African-Americans.  Brutal
discrimination in the US, which had become more visible through film and television, was a
serious liability to US foreign policy.  Given the attitudes of many in Congress, it is likely that
some who voted for the Civil Rights Act were concerned with US influence abroad rather than
racial justice at home.
Race-conscious affirmative action programs like Kaiser's were controversial, and some
legislators who voted for the Act may have embraced a legislative purpose that excluded them. 
We have inadequate ground to assume that the purpose cited by Justice Brennan, or any purpose,
was endorsed by an intentional consensus.
Intentionalism maintains that the meaning, purpose, or proper application of a law
depends on the intentions of the lawmakers.  In the absence of an intentional consensus, the
theory implies that the law lacks determinate meaning, purpose, or proper application.  It then
implies that the law is indeterminate when we have no other reason to draw that conclusion.  As
the law's apparent meaning, which centers on its text and prevailing linguistic conventions, is
unlikely to be radically indeterminate, unrestricted intentionalism would seem to have some false
implications.
We have no idea how frequently this happens.  We do not know how often there is an
intentional consensus and how often one is lacking.30  Those who frame intentionalist arguments
never explicitly argue that an intentional consensus obtained, and the evidence of intent that they
offer always falls radically short of making a plausible case.
The lack of an intentional consensus need not be commonplace to be troublesome.  The
result, I am suggesting, is that the theory then generates a false claim, that the law in question
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lacks determinate meaning, purpose, or proper application.  Unless false implications are
eliminable through principled revision of the theory, they destroy a theory's credibility.
And we have no reason to suppose that these implications of the theory are eliminable. 
On the contrary, the existence of an intentional consensus seems crucial to most applications of
intentionalism.  This problem therefore provides another reason for regarding intentionalism as
untenable.  Until reasonably justified and revised accordingly, it cannot responsibly be used in
legal interpretation.
Reconstructing Purposive Interpretations.
Although I have argued that the interpretation of written law cannot responsibly be based on the
theory that courts should be guided by what the lawmakers had in mind, I do not wish to claim
that all seemingly intentionalist interpretations are unsalvageable.  I want tentatively to suggest,
rather, that we understand some of them independently of intentionalist theory.  The salvageable
arguments assume different principles, to which the problems of unrestricted intentionalism do
not accrue.
There are reasons for trying to salvage purposive interpretations -- reasons that do not
apply to applicational interpretations.
If intentionalist interpretations reflect unrestricted intentionalism, we should expect to
find that some, at least, are supported by systematically marshalled information about the
relevant lawmakers' attitudes, sufficient to make a plausible case for an intentional consensus --
sufficient, that is, to rebut the reasonable suspicion that a significant fraction of those who voted
for the laws (or who were instrumental in effecting the legal changes) did not endorse the
sponsors' aims but acted as they did for extraneous political or personal reasons.  A striking
feature of intentionalist interpretations in practice, however, is that such evidence of an
intentional consensus is rarely offered.  Sometimes the stated views of a very small fraction of
the relevant lawmakers are noted by interpreters (as when the most articulate sponsors of
proposed legal changes are looked to for interpretive guidance).  Sometimes historical evidence
is entirely lacking.
Consider the following purposive interpretation.  In 1987 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit decided a bankruptcy case involving the application of a 1935 Wisconsin
statute that allowed debtors to retain certain implements and tools rather than sell them as part of
a bankruptcy settlement.31  The items that an indebted farmer was specifically allowed by the
statute to retain included a mower and a hay loader.  A bankruptcy judge and a district court
judge, whose decisions were being appealed, had allowed a bankrupt farmer to retain a baler and
a haybine, in place of the listed hay loader and mower, although neither implement was listed in
the statute.  Judge Easterbrook noted:
A baler not only loads hay on a wagon but also ties it in bales; a haybine not only mows
hay but also conditions it.  Both the bankruptcy judge and the district judge concluded
that the extra functions of the machines did not prevent their exemption. (Id at 1091)
Judge Easterbrook observed, "The statute is designed to give farmers a fresh start." (Id at 1094) 
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The list of implements "comprises the equipment that in 1935 would have kept a small farm in
operation.  But small farms now use a different set of equipment.... If the statute applies only to
farm implements customary in 1935, and therefore omits the [baler and] haybine, it does not
achieve its purpose today." (Id at 1092)  Although he did not say so explicitly, Judge Easterbrook
seems to have assumed that allowing bankrupt farmers to retain balers and haybines in place of
hay loaders and mowers would serve the statute's purpose.
If Judge Easterbrook's reasoning assumed unrestricted intentionalism, it would be
radically undersupported by the evidence he offered.  For the only apparent ground of his
interpretation was a law review article32 that provided no information at all about the attitudes of
the enacting lawmakers.
Purposive interpretations offered by judges and lawyers are often like that.  If we
supposed that they reflect unrestricted intentionalism, then we should regard them as radically
underdefended.  A striking feature of the legal literature is that purposive interpretations are not
treated in that way.  I want now to suggest why.
In many cases, the attribution of a purpose to some written law is not purely historical.  It
is based mainly, if not entirely, upon a different sort of judgment.  The purposes attributed to
laws seem typically to be regarded by the interpreters as the laws' justifying rationales.
Viewed in the way I am now suggesting, Judge Easterbrook's argument does not
presuppose an intentional consensus.  In his written opinion -- as in many others and in many
legal commentaries -- what is cited as a purpose appears to be regarded as a justifying rationale
of the law under interpretation.
This way of understanding purposive arguments makes much better sense of them than
does unrestricted intentionalism.  When purposive interpretations are based on the justifying
rationales of laws, they cannot fail simply because there was no relevant consensus. 
Justification-based interpretations can draw insight or inspiration from statements by the original
lawmakers, but a justification-guided interpreter may legitimately draw upon other sources, too.
The approach is suggested by some of the familiar intentionalist rhetoric, which
occasionally indicates it is concerned to idealize lawmakers' intentions.  Here's an example:
Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which
the makers had in view.... "... In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within
the equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the law-maker present, and that you
have asked him the question, did you intend to comprehend this case?  Then you must
give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man,
would have given."33
I can suggest a rationale for justification-based interpretation.  Law tells us what we must
or must not do, threatening sanctions for disobedience.  It regulates death and taxes, war and
peace, and innumerable other matters that are of direct, vital interest to individuals.  Moral
justification is required for such governmental actions.  Someone whose interests are affected by
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law has a right to be treated in a morally defensible way.  We take this for granted in our
everyday thinking about the law, and those who presume to speak on behalf of the law usually
claim that it justifies what is done to people in its name.
The required moral justification of particular legal judgments cannot assume the consent
of the parties or the fairness to them of the system as a whole.  Many of those who come before
courts do so under duress and have lacked a reasonable opportunity to affect the content of the
laws.34  Many defendants participate only to avoid default or contempt judgments.  We cannot
assume that, if they had a choice, they would approve of the laws that determine their fates or
that they are morally committed to the law that is applied.  The justification of the adverse
treatment that some receive as the result of adjudication cannot be based on the generally fair
treatment they receive, if they are among those subject to systematic discrimination.  What is
typically done to people in the name of the law requires substantive moral justification.
The point of a justification-based approach is that its use promises to increase the
likelihood that the application of law is morally justifiable.  When interpretation renders a law
morally justifiable, its application is more likely to be justifiable than the application of the same
law under an interpretation that renders it unjustifiable.  The more justifiable the law being
applied, the more justifiable its applications are likely to be.  That provides a reason for
interpreting laws so that they are as justifiable as possible.35
Understood in the way I have suggested, a purposive interpretation involves a complex
value judgment, about what best justifies an item of written law.  The judgment is complex
because one must consider the actual provisions of the law, interpretive precedents, justifications
of related laws, and problems of enforcement.  Such judgments can be problematic, but
responsible lawmakers are frequently called upon to make them.
Justification-based interpretation requires more extended and systematic discussion on
another occasion; some themes can only be suggested here.  Its rationale is problematic, for
experience indicates that courts cannot be relied upon to provide sound justification-based
interpretations.  The strategy is limited in scope, as not all law is morally justifiable, and
unjustifiable laws cannot be given sound justification-based interpretation.  The interpretation of
unjustifiable laws must proceed differently.
If so, and if the main argument of this paper is sound, then my final suggestion is that
there seems little prospect of a defensible single-criterion interpretive theory for law.
